

C O P Y

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25 August 1950

Chief, [REDACTED] 25X1A8a

Acting Chief, [REDACTED]

Psychological Intelligence Division, ORE

Reference: Draft Memo by Plans and Policies Division, ORE, 17 August.

1. The setting up of a Psychological Intelligence Division on a sound basis seems to me extremely desirable; such a division would fill a great gap in the present total intelligence effort. In that respect I would strongly concur with the Plans and Policies memorandum. But as far as the [REDACTED] is concerned, I see no possibility of its having time to carry on its present minimum functions (including the Far East Survey to which we are now committed) and add to those functions the new ones which the memorandum appears to contemplate, at any time in the immediate future. Out time is now fully committed, and with the continuance of our present functions we simply could not add new ones. 25X1A8a

2. There is also the question of whether, even if we had time, we and the other proposed personnel would be competent to do what really ought to be done. I would like to say, therefore, what I think the functions of a Psychological Intelligence Division could and should be. It seems to me that its potential usefulness extends far beyond the field of psychological warfare in the usual sense of that term. Psychological intelligence is also an indispensable basis for many major decisions of governmental policy. To take just two illustrations; an accurate appraisal of the attitudes of rank-and-file Chinese toward Mao and Chiang was a necessary basis for major American decisions in regard to China; and an accurate appraisal of rank-and-file Arab sentiment and fighting morale (as distinguished from the statements of Arab leaders) was a necessary basis for realistic policy in regard to Palestine. In every part of the world, realistic knowledge of what is going on in people's minds is perhaps the most essential single ingredient in the intelligence background on which major policy decisions must rest. This is most obviously true with reference to the activities of the Voice of America and other purely verbal elements in the psychological warfare we are waging against the Kremlin; it is equally though less obviously true with regard to major decisions (such as the decision to support Bao Dai or to defend Formosa or to rearm Germany) which must be evaluated partly in terms of their world-wide psychological repercussions. These decisions are the more important elements in "psychological warfare", broadly defined; and accurate knowledge in advance with regard to how a given decision will be received by world public opinion is therefore the most important aspect or outcome of "psychological intelligence", conceived as broadly as it should be conceived.

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
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3. If more than a little is to be done in reaching this goal, it seems to me that the necessary personnel would include the following:

a. At least two persons* (one, perhaps, for Western Europe and one for the Far East) with intimate first-hand knowledge of the "common people" in those areas. The greatest single danger, perhaps, is that a Psychological Intelligence Division would be staffed predominantly by Americans of limited foreign experience who fail to appreciate the psychological gulf that separates the sidewalks of Washington from the rice-paddies of Indochina. Contacts with embassy personnel in foreign capitals would not be adequate either; it is the masses of the people, rather than the elite in a given foreign area, which it is most important--and most difficult--to understand. Such first-hand knowledge would be essential both as a basis for immediate generalizations about rank-and-file psychology and as a background for evaluating the methods of research that might be set up to get the answers to still-unanswered questions.

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c. One person with psychological warfare experience. This might come from OWI/ experience during the war; it would be even or OSS

better if it come from recent experience in the Voice of America. Anti-Stalin propaganda is necessarily different from anti-Hitler propaganda (especially in its approach to working-class psychology), and the Voice of America people are the chief ones who have concrete experience in the job of exposing Stalinism. There is also the problem of establishing a close working relationship between the Psychological Intelligence Division and State Department personnel who, even in wartime, might be the chief users of intelligence relative to psychological warfare. To establish a good working relationship it is probably necessary to be able to "talk their language." Information gained informally from the Program

* Throughout this discussion, a "person" means a higher-level person with as much staff as he needs to make his work effective.

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Evaluation Branch of IED suggests that the desk heads in the Voice of America would welcome suggestions from outside if they are concrete and down-to-earth in terms of the day-by-day operation of the Voice. If the suggestions were made by an individual in CIA who had had VOA experience, who know the VOA people, who "talked their language," and in whom they already had confidence, it is likely that the suggestions would be very welcome. And in any case, even if the Psychological Intelligence Division confined itself to basic fact-finding rather than specific suggestions, its selection of facts and its way of organizing those facts should depend in large part upon what the chief practitioners of psychological warfare need to know.

d. One person with a social-scientist's appreciation of the inter-relationships between public opinion and the total structure of society, and especially its class structure. Such a person might be a social psychologist, sociologist, anthropologist, historian, political scientist, economist, or high-level journalist; what matter is broad grasp and an analytical approach rather than the particular area of specialization within the social sciences.

e. One person with a thorough knowledge of the opponent's propaganda--i.e., Soviet propaganda, its techniques, its appeals, its strong points, its vulnerabilities.

f. If one major purpose of the Division is to discover weak points in the psychology of the Soviet Union, there should also be a Russian expert who is familiar with every sort of available knowledge about the Soviet Union.

4. For maximum efficiency, it seems to me that these seven persons (or a smaller number, if two or more of these types of background could be combined in the same individual), should have time for a good deal of discussion and pooling of their various types of data and analytical skills. Their joint product should be something decidedly better and sounder than any one of them could accomplish by himself. This means that they should not be handicapped by lack of clerical help or bogged down by routine work on separate projects.

5. The memorandum does not describe the present or future composition of the "ORE Psychological Intelligence Unit," which is the first of the four proposed components of a Psychological Intelligence Division. Perhaps it would or could contain the types of personnel described above. It is clear, however, that not more than three of the seven are represented by persons now in the other three components of the group. Between them they could provide at least one analytical social scientist, several persons with a good knowledge of the opponent's propaganda, and probably one Russian expert. But there are no person (to my knowledge) with firsthand knowledge of the common people in either Western Europe or the Far East, no specialists in public opinion research, and no persons experienced in psychological warfare. In the absence of these persons I

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don't see how a Psychological Intelligence Division could possibly do a really adequate job. It would be a little like trying to make a whole man out of nothing but two legs and an arm.

6. Another major factor in the success of the proposed Division would be the caliber of the man who headed it. I don't see any possibility of getting a really big man to head it unless he is offered both an adequate salary and an adequate staff. In my opinion the proposed staff would be wholly inadequate from that point of view. A big man might be greatly attracted by the prospect of heading up a combination of talents such as has been outlined above; he would almost certainly not be attracted by a staff which had no public opinion analyst, no one with psychological warfare experience, and no one with intensive area knowledge of Western Europe or the Far East.

7. I suppose the immediate problem is not what should ideally exist but simply getting started in the right direction. If the present functions of the Special Reports Branch were to be continued (including the new Far East commitment), it could contribute very little even to an interim and admittedly inadequate psychological intelligence program. But perhaps the personnel in the other proposed components of the Division could begin something on an experimental basis, using outside consultants [REDACTED]

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A start in the right direction does seem to me to be urgently necessary; it would be unfortunate, then, if the present commitments of the Special Reports Branch kept ^{the} people from doing what they could do in this direction.

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